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Human Dignity and the Claim of
Meaning: Athenian Tragic Drama
and Supreme Court Opinions

JAMES BOYD WHITE

I am going to bring together what may seem at first to be two extremely different institutions for the creation of public meaning, namely classical Athenian tragedy and the Supreme
Court opinion.1 My object is not so much to draw lines of similarity and distinction between
them, as a cultural analyst might do, as to try to capture something of what I believe is centrally
at work in both institutions, in fact essential to what each at its best achieves. I can frame it as a
question: How is it that the best instances of each genre (for I will be talking only about the best)
work to resist the ever-present impulse to trivialize human life and experience—certainly well
known in our own era—and instead confer upon the individual, and his or her sufferings and
struggles in the world, a kind of dignity? I think that something like this is in fact the core of the
most important achievements of both institutions, and that in both cases it is simultaneously
imaginative (or literary) and political in nature.
I mean not to make an especially original
or controversial point, but to call upon a familiar and widespread intuition. I assume that
we all sometimes have the feeling that what
we are reading—or watching or hearing—
trivializes human experience, reducing it to
something unimportant or insignificant and
stimulating a kind of cynicism or despair. But
of course we also sometimes have the opposite feeling, that the expression or action to
which we are exposed—the Bach cantata, the
painting by Vermeer, the poem by Keats or

Dickinson—somehow dignifies or exalts the
human, marking out possibilities for significance in life, in our lives, that can serve as a
ground of hope in a universe full of confusion
and suffering. We can’t easily explain how it
happens, but in the first case we come away
somehow ashamed of being a human being, in
the second, proud and glad to belong to such a
species.
Speaking of my own experience, and I
hope yours too, at least some theatrical productions, and some Supreme Court opinions
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too, give me the second (and better) kind of
response, and in this talk I want to explore
how and why that happens. I shall not summarize my conclusions now except to say that a
large part of my attention will be on the way
in which both the dramas and the opinions I
shall examine imagine human beings as
speaking creatures—on what, that is, they
make speech mean. This will lead me to suggest at the end what I mean as a major point,
that it is in our capacity for claiming meaning
for experience that our deepest dignity lies,
and that it is in the denial of that capacity, and
what it says about us, that the essence of
trivialization can be found.
I shall begin with what I assume to be the
less familiar form, Greek drama, and then turn
to the law.
First, some background. In Athens the

performance of tragedy was a highly public
and intensively competitive event which occurred in its full grandeur only once a year, at
the great festival of Dionysus. Only three dramatists were permitted to compete; they were
chosen several months ahead of time, and
given that period in which to perfect the performance of the four-play sequences they had
submitted. What we might call “rehearsal”
was no small or casual matter; it cost roughly
as much to train a chorus for a single set of
plays as it did to keep a warship at sea for a
year, and rich men were called upon by the
state to bear this burden. The plays were performed at the Theater of Dionysus, next to the
Acropolis; they were then judged, by officials
or by the crowd, with prizes of great honor
awarded for the best play, best actor, best chorus, and so forth.2
The tragic theater was a cultural form, an

In Athens, the performance of tragedy was a highly public and intensely competitive event, which occurred in
its full grandeur only once a year, at the great festival of Dionysus. It cost roughly as much to train a chorus for
a single set of plays as it did to keep a warship for a year. The plays were performed at the Theater of Dionysus
(pictured), next to the Acropolis.
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occasion for the making of public and shared
meaning, that had certain ways of working.
These were naturally realized differently by
different playwrights and in different plays,
but running through this body of work there
are three important strands that I would like to
bring to your attention. As we shall later see,
these three strands, perhaps surprisingly, have
analogues in some of the best opinions of the
Supreme Court.

Bringing the Remote Into the
Circle of Attention
I shall begin with the great trilogy of Aeschylus called the Oresteia. The first play, the
Agamemnon, tells the story of that hero’s return to Mycenae from the Trojan War, and how
he is shamefully killed—in his bath—by his
wife Clytemnestra and her lover Aegistheus;
the second play tells how her son Orestes, commanded by Apollo to avenge this murder of his
father, kills his mother; the third brings on
stage in pursuit of Orestes the Eumenides, the
dreadful furies who punish the shedding of
kindred blood. Orestes finds refuge in Athens,
where he is tried for his act by a court and jury
established for the purpose. He is acquitted, for
he was acting under divine compulsion in the
form of explicit orders from Apollo. The trilogy thus ends with the establishment in Athens
of courts of justice; courts that will, in the future, break a chain of vengeance such as that
which plagued the house of Atreus, and do so
by imposing sanctions for homicide that themselves do not occasion blood guilt.
The Agamemnon begins with a watchman
in Mycenae waiting, at dawn, for the beacon
of light that will announce the victory at
Troy—for Clytemnestra has arranged for fires
to be lit on mountain top after mountain top,
to bring this news across the sea in a single
night. Next, the chorus, in a song about the
events that have led up to the present, tells
how Agamemnon, on his way to Troy ten
years earlier, his fleet held in harbor by adverse winds, sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia
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to persuade the gods to let him go—a terrible
crime that Clytemnestra will later invoke as a
justification for her own terrible crime. Soon
after, a messenger arrives to describe the sack
of Troy, in his vivid account bringing directly
before the other characters within the play—
and before the audience in Athens, too—these
remote and perilous happenings.
I wish to draw attention here to a rather
simple fact, namely, that the drama brings into
the space we call the theater, and before the
minds of the people of Athens, imagined
events that are distant in both time and place.
Thus the audience is here asked to imagine
Mycenae at the time of the fall of Troy, Troy
itself, the chain of mountain tops running
from Troy to Mycenae, the sacrifice of
Iphigenia ten years earlier, and so on.3
In an age of television, movies, newspapers, and the Internet, it may be difficult to see
this for the surprising and powerful cultural
phenomenon it was, for we are besieged with
communications that invite us to imagine the
remote and distant. But these plays took place
in a different kind of world, one in which this
was a real invention. In bringing on stage, and
into the conscious imaginings of the people,
events that were remote in time and space, the
drama invited the audience to connect themselves to the distant. This was, I think, one of
the central functions of the Athenian theater,
and it had a perhaps surprising political and
ethical significance.4
Think, for example, of another play by
Aeschylus, The Persians. This tells the story
of the great naval battle at Salamis, at which
the Athenians destroyed the Persian invaders.
Writing ten years after the battle, Aeschylus
locates the action of his play surprisingly in
Persia itself, where we see the royal women of
Persia awaiting news of the expedition. The
audience sees these events, not from the point
of view of Athens, as a wonderful triumph,
but from the point of view of the Persian
women, for whom it is a disaster and with
whose suffering one must sympathize. Of
course, the audience is really Athenian, so
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The Persians tells the story of the great naval battle at Salamis in 480 B.C. at which the Athenians destroyed
the Persian invaders. Aeschylus, who wrote the play ten years after the battle, chose to tell the tale from the
point of view of the royal women of Persia awaiting news of the ill-fated expedition.

they actually see it both ways at once—they
are forced to do so—and that double vision is
a central part of the meaning of the play.
At the climax of The Persians, a messenger reports the story of the battle itself, to
which he was an eyewitness—telling how the
Persians were tricked into rowing around the
island of Salamis all night, then penned into a
narrow bay from which they could not escape.
These events in fact took place just a few
miles away from Athens—the audience can
see the mountains of Salamis from their
seats—which means that in this play, occurring in Athens but set in Persia, Athens itself
is brought on stage, simultaneously into the
imagined world of Persia and the real world of
Athens itself. The play thus makes Athens
look at itself as it appears to others.
In setting the play up this way, Aeschylus
is I think talking to his citizens about their
own world, simultaneously stimulating pride
in their great victory and disciplining that

pride by the recognition of the terrible loss it
brought to others. He is also telling the Athenians that they should guard against the heady
overconfidence that might otherwise naturally
arise in them from the victory. In a real sense
this play is thus a teaching play, teaching the
public something crucial about its moral situation, as the Oresteia taught it something
about its central institutions—in both cases,
by bringing to awareness what is distant in
time and space, and morally distant too.
It is not just that the theater carries distant
events before the consciousness of the people.
It brings into the light of day facts—or forces
or ideas or impulses—that are normally repressed or hidden: the reality of the experience of the Persian women, for example, or of
the murdered Iphigenia, or the psychic and
moral forces represented by the Furies in the
Eumenides—monstrous deities who normally
live out of sight, underground, so hideous in
the performance, says one account, that
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women miscarried at the sight of them. Perhaps the most famous example of this habit of
bringing on to the stage what in a deep sense
is felt to belong off it is the Oedipus Tyrannos
of Sophocles, where, as Freud helped us see,
some of the most profound and disturbing of
human psychological forces are brought directly into the consciousness of the audience,
as it contemplates Oedipus’ violation of the
central taboos against incest and parricide.
A particularly striking instance of this
impulse lies in the theater’s treatment of
women. In the world of Athens, women had a
legal and social position mainly as the possessions of men, whether fathers or husbands;
even in procreation they were imagined to
contribute nothing to the child except a kind
of oven in which the male seed could grow;
and they themselves had no property and no
civil rights. Yet by all three dramatists they
are represented on stage as psychological and
moral actors who are in every sense (except
power) the equal of men. It may be indeed that
such figures as Antigone and her sister
Ismene, Phaedra, Medea, and Alcestis are the
most deeply and fully realized women in
Western literature until Shakespeare, perhaps
even Jane Austen. It is hard to know how fully
to explain this phenomenon, but I think it is
another expression of the general impulse to
put on stage what is real but unseen—a part of
life that is normally excluded from the vision
of the male citizens who made up most of the
audience.5
In all of these ways the drama works as a
way of expanding and intensifying our sense
of what it means to be human, making it possible to pay attention to what we had not fully
seen before. This kind of drama is not merely
a kind of entertainment, but a major public
and political event, one of the purposes of
which, at the hands of the three great geniuses
whose work we have, is educative and
transformative.
I want now to turn from Athenian tragic
drama to the form we call the judicial opinion,
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especially the opinion of the Supreme Court
of the United States. There are, of course, obvious differences between these forms of
speech and life, but I think there are also significant parallels. What we call the Supreme
Court is in an important sense not this building, nor the nine men and women who sit on
the Court, nor even all those who have done
so in the past, but an entity that exists primarily in cultural and imaginative and political
space. It is a public arena, bounded by its own
structures and rules, one function of which is
to bring certain stories and the problems they
present into public attention, not for the sake
of entertainment but in some sense for education or enlightenment. Likewise, it has its own
sense of time, in which the remote is brought
into the present. The time and space it creates
and within which it works are in a sense of its
own making; it is the Court itself that gives
significance and reality to these dimensions of
its existence; and it does so in the form which
its great Chief Justice Marshall did much to
invent, the opinion of the Court.6
Like the ancient theater of Athens, the
Court is thus an institution for the making of
shared and public meaning. What is more, it
shares the more particular feature I have just
described, for it too regularly brings into the
circle of public attention events and people
and places that are normally overlooked or excluded or just not seen. This is in fact one of
its central functions.
As a way of exploring how this works in
a particular instance, I now turn to Cohen v.
California, a famous First Amendment case to
which I shall refer throughout this article.7 Its
facts reflect the era of the Vietnam War, including protests against it. The defendant,
Paul Robert Cohen, wore a jacket bearing the
words “Fuck the Draft” while walking down a
corridor of the Los Angeles municipal courthouse. He was then arrested and convicted of
violating a California penal statute that made
it an offense to “maliciously and willfully disturb the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or
person . . . by . . . offensive conduct.” The de-
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One of the central functions of the Supreme Court, like Athenian tragedy, is to bring to attention events and
people that are normally overlooked or excluded. In this article, the author compares Cohen v. California
(1971), a Supreme Court decision involving a Vietnam War draft protester, to Greek drama.

fendant engaged in no other conduct alleged
to disturb the peace. The state court imposed a
penalty of thirty days in jail. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, reversed the conviction.
The judicial process here brings into a
zone of public awareness material that is normally unseen, most obviously and dramatically, and perhaps a bit embarrassingly, in the
use of the word “fuck”—a word which, although known, I assume, to almost all English
speakers, is normally used only on certain
kinds of occasions, with certain kinds of audience, and is definitely excluded from most
formal discourse, certainly the discourse of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Justice Harlan marks the distance between this
term and the language of the Supreme
Court—and the decorous conversation he
seeks to establish with his readers—by the
way he recites the facts of the case, not in his
own words but those of the California court:
“On April 26, 1968, the defendant was ob-

served in the Los Angeles County Courthouse
in the corridor outside of division 20 of the
municipal court wearing a jacket bearing the
words ‘Fuck the Draft’ which were plainly
visible.”8 He thus quotes the language but distances himself from it.
This is not the only way in which the repressed or unknown is brought by the opinion
in Cohen to a place where it can be seen and
thought about and responded to in a new and
deeper way. Mr. Cohen’s story was from almost all other perspectives a trivial one, a
minor skirmish in the national war about the
war. He was not, so far as I know, otherwise
an important person in the world, but just a
young man opposed to the draft. This was a
case of no political or public significance until
the Court made it so, saying that despite the
apparent triviality of the event the issues presented here—presented, that is, by the lawyers, and seen and articulated by the Court in
this very opinion—“are of no small constitutional significance.”9
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This process—giving significance to the
apparently insignificant—is a major part of
what the Court regularly does. Think, for example, of a case like Powell v. Texas,10 where
an alcoholic pauper was thrown into jail overnight to sober up, to all the actors as minor
and routine an event as occurs in police work;
the Supreme Court made this the object of
learned, and contrasting, reflections on the
conditions upon which the state may punish
conduct as criminal, especially conduct arising from disease, in a set of opinions that
might have remade criminal law in this country.11 In this case—as in every criminal procedure case, in nearly every First Amendment
case, and throughout the law, really—the unimportant is made important. This has its own
political meaning, for it says that there is no
case too small, no person too insignificant, to
be worthy of potential attention. Here and
elsewhere the Court makes big law by attending to small events. No one is excluded on
principle.
When a dramatist invokes what is physically or morally distant, we naturally ask what
he will make of it: what meaning will he claim
for the story of Iphigenia or the looting of
Troy or the events at the Persian court? The
answer will always lie in particularities of
writing and performance. In the same way,
when Mr. Cohen’s story is brought into the
theater of the courtroom, we ask what it will
be made to mean by the lawyers and by the
Court, and this, too, is of necessity a highly
particular matter, tied intimately to the facts
of the case. For, as every lawyer knows, we do
not and cannot know ahead of time the cluster
of arguments on both sides by which the law
will work in a particular case, which the Court
must in turn resolve, and which it will use and
transform in its own opinion.
This particularity requires a kind of attention, makes possible a kind of invention, different from the kind of talk usual in political
or theoretical debate. What is happening in
the Cohen case, from one perspective, is just
another event in the long struggle over the
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meaning of the Vietnam War. But the law
cannot think in such terms; it must fashion itself to meet the particularities of the case as
these emerge in thought and argument. And
when the bright light of attention is focused
on what we have not seen, or not seen clearly,
it almost always reveals a complexity and
richness of significance that we had missed,
thus putting in question, among other things,
our own prior habits of mind and imagination.
In the Cohen case, the large issue—that of the
draft and the war itself—is, of course, on everybody’s mind. What the law does here is
take a tiny fragment of that larger story, this
simple act of protest, and examine it not in the
terms of the national political debate—prowar
or antiwar—but as a constitutional problem,
to be analyzed, argued, and decided in the
terms established by this branch of the law.
This means, as we shall soon see, that an essential part of the opinion will be a delineation
of these terms, an account of the universe of
meaning established by the First Amendment
and the cases decided under it.
Like the drama, then, the opinion not
only brings before us what is remote in time
and space but in doing so creates a world of
imagination, simultaneously drawn from the
world we otherwise know and an alternative
to it. The idea in both cases is not to offer the
audience an escape into fantasy, but to create
an imagined reality that can run against the
“real world,” both to test it and to be tested by
it. In both forms, particularity is essential to
the art; and in both forms, the created order is
at once final and tentative: final because it
reaches a conclusion, comes to an end; tentative because the rest of life continues, creating
an ever-changing context that will challenge
or confirm the imagined order in new and different ways.

Movement to Discovery by
Dramatic Opposition
Perhaps a more familiar feature of Greek
tragedy is that it lives and works dramatically,

52

JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY

by the interaction between different characters speaking out of their respective situations
in different voices. This too was a real invention, for the first forms of drama were purely
choral performances; at first one actor was
added to the chorus, then another, then, finally, by Sophocles, the third.12
The opposition of character to character
is so much the soul of what we think of as
drama, then and now, that it is hard to appreciate the force and originality of the invention.
Think, for example, of the opposition between
Creon and Antigone over the relative authority of the city’s decrees and those of the timeless and unwritten laws that the young woman
invokes; or of the confrontation between
Orestes and the Furies at his trial for the murder of Clytemnestra; or, in the play that bears
her name, of the intense struggle between
Medea and Jason. Or, to shift nearer our own
world, think of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, which
can be seen as a set of antagonistic conversations between Hamlet and others—Gertrude
and Claudius and Polonius and Laertes and
Horatio—each defining somewhat differently
the meaning of the past they share and of contemplated future action too. The question the
play presents is, what kind of sense can be
made of a world defined by such contrasting
possibilities of speech and meaning?
It is equally obvious that, with us at least,
the law works in a similar way: by the opposition of character against character, plaintiff
against defendant, each representing a different vision of the world—and of the law—and
seeking to establish its own as the dominant
one. The central legal institution we call the
hearing works by a disciplined opposition that
is intended to lead, and sometimes does, to
deeper understanding, indeed, to the revelation of central questions theretofore obscured
by our ignorance, or by our habits of thought
and imagination.13 It is not simply that play
and trial work by opposition, but that the opposition leads the participants and the audience to new discoveries, about what has happened and what it means, about what ought to

happen, about who these people are and ought
to be.
As the play often takes as its subject a familiar story from mythology or history, which
is told in such a way as to reveal new possibilities of meaning, so the hearing often begins
with a set of preconceived ideas—in the parties, judge, and lawyers alike—about the facts
and their significance, about the law and its
bearing upon them; these are tested and complicated in argument and sometimes completely transformed. When the play and the
hearing work well, they are both processes
that carry us by the force of opposition from a
position defined by our pre-existing expectations into quite different and often surprising
terrain. This happens in Cohen itself: this is a
case to the facts of which lots of people, including judges and lawyers, would have
highly predictable responses, pro or con, and
one of the functions of the opinion is to complicate these responses, perhaps beyond recognition, by the discipline of the body of
thought and law developed under the First
Amendment.
I shall not belabor this point of comparison, which seems plain enough as it stands,
but wish to make a particular point about the
way the law works in this respect. It is true
that in Cohen, as usual in American law, the
lawyers for the two sides create a drama of opposition that the Court will in turn address.
But notice that Cohen himself is not a participant in this conversation. His original
speech—the slogan on his jacket—is reported
by others, but he himself has no opportunity to
say what it should be said to mean in the language of the law. That is the task in the first
instance of the lawyers, then of the courts.
Unlike Orestes or Oedipus, Cohen is a real
flesh-and-blood person, with his own ways of
talking, his own vision of the meaning and
perhaps the necessity of what he did, and none
of this is present in the legal argument, especially on appeal.
The law thus provides a second language,
into which the languages and experiences of
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ordinary life must be translated. The people of
the law will locate and define what happened
in the real world in these terms, placing what
Cohen himself actually said and did in a larger
context, which will in turn do much to shape
the kind of meaning that can now be claimed
for Cohen’s words. The law is in this way a
cultural process, working on the raw material
of life—the injury to the body or the psyche,
the failed business, the broken marriage, the
vulgar words in the courthouse—to convert it
into something else, something of its own: the
occasion for the assertion of a certain sort of
meaning. It is a kind of translation.
One of the striking features of the opinion
in Cohen, and one of its great merits, is that it
acknowledges this fact about itself: the difference between ordinary language and legal
language is not erased or elided, as it usually
is, but made inescapably prominent. In addition to the usual dramatic opposition between
the lawyers, there is thus another overt tension, between two registers of discourse and
between the people who speak in these different ways: between Mr. Cohen, wearing his
jacket with its blunt-spoken legend into the
municipal courthouse, and Justice Harlan,
speaking as he does in elaborate and sophisticated legal terms about that event. On one
side, we have the crude and simple phrase, a
gesture of contempt and defiance that seems
to express the view that nothing else need be
said, to claim that this is a wholly adequate response to the issue of policy it addresses, indeed the only proper response. On the other
side, we have a mind of great fastidiousness
and care, defining, by the way it works
through the issues, a set of crucial cultural and
social values: the values of learning, of balance and comprehensiveness of mind, of
human intelligence, of depth of understanding. Nothing could seemingly be further from
the mind exemplified in this elegant, complex, civilized composition than the kind of
crude speech it protects.14 And by creating in
his own voice a tone that respects ordinary
canons of decency in expression, then incor-
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porating this vulgarism within it, Justice
Harlan performs, at the level of the text, just
what he says the First Amendment requires of
society in places like the courthouse: the toleration of what we normally exclude or suppress.
In this way, while protecting the speech
Justice Harlan distances himself from it, defining himself and the Court as different from,
indeed, opposed to, the values—the sense of
self and other, the idea of public thinking and
speaking—expressed by it. It is this distance
that enables him credibly to say at one point
that the tolerance of “cacophony” required by
the First Amendment may be a sign of
strength, not weakness, in the society that is
capable of it. This is a message that he does
not merely articulate but performs or enacts
throughout the whole opinion, for he simultaneously protects Cohen’s speech and exemplifies ways of thinking and talking that are at
the other end of the spectrum. Do not imagine
from this opinion that you might be well advised to use language like that on Mr. Cohen’s
jacket in addressing the Supreme Court, or
that to display such a jacket in a courtroom
might be immune from sanction.
It is important to notice in this First
Amendment case that the kind of speech that
the opinion exemplifies and values in its own
performance is not really “free speech,” but
the opposite of that, highly regulated and constrained: by the principle of judicial authority,
which requires serious attention to earlier
cases and to the tensions between them; by a
conception of excellence in legal thought,
which shapes the kind of attention Justice
Harlan gives to those cases; and by canons of
civilized and rational discourse, including
grammar and syntax, which govern the forms
of expression. It is, in fact, this very quality of
Harlan’s opinion that makes its protection of
Cohen’s slogan so significant and important:
it is protecting something very different from
itself, and in doing so it defines the kind of
toleration the First Amendment has at its center. Yet when it does so it recognizes, almost
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The author argues that Justice
John Marshall Harlan’s opinion
in Cohen simultaneously protected the draft protester’s
speech and exemplified ways of
thinking and talking that were at
the other end of the spectrum in
terms
of
eloquence
and
decorum.

of necessity, that this other utterance has a
force and value which may be missing from
the opinion itself; indeed, it almost necessarily suggests that there may be times when the
right response to a political situation is not
more reason, not more civilization, but the
kind of verbal gesture one cannot quite imagine Justice Harlan, as he defines himself here,
ever making.
For there are points in this opinion at
which one might be less inclined to call
Harlan’s manner of speech “elegant” or “sophisticated” than “stuffy” or “stilted”—as, for
example, when he says that we should remember that human speech “conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached

explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well,” and goes on to add that the
Constitution should not be assumed to have
little or no regard for this “emotive” function
which “may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.”15 When I hear this, I at least have
the feeling that I am in the presence of highly
overformal speech, the workings of a mind
that is at the moment constricted by its own
commitments to a certain kind of thought. But
this very fact has its dramatic and literary
function, for it enacts for us what it might
mean to insist, as California wants to do, that
Cohen should be compelled to translate his utterance into more formal and generally ac-
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ceptable speech—this would make him sound
like me, Harlan is in effect saying, and it
would bleed what he says of all its life and
vigor.
We can see now that the other impulse I
mentioned, the bringing on stage of that
which is unrecognized or alien or perhaps
taboo, is at work through the entire opinion.
Harlan brings on this phrase, this moment, not
only to protect it, but to establish a dramatic
tension with it, a tension that validates it as
well as tolerates it. One is reminded of Shakespeare’s capacity to see the world from every
point of view, in this sense to humanize every
monster. Even Caliban, the subhuman creature who tries to rape Miranda and destroy
Prospero, is given his moments of sympathy,
and more than sympathy—of unique and
beautiful expression.

Claiming Meaning for Experience
In addition to its way of imagining the
distant and remote, and its way of working by
dramatic opposition, Greek tragedy has a third
feature, harder to define than the others but no
less important, not only for Athens but in its
consequences for the literary and dramatic
imagination ever since. What I have in mind is
a certain sort of speech in which a speaker
looks back over his experience as a whole—
and thus our experience too—seeking to find
a meaning in it, to claim a meaning for it, and
such a meaning as will enable him or her to
shape his or her future speech and conduct in a
coherent and valuable way.
Not all dramatic speech has this quality.
Much of it consists of simple response to
events, in the form of lamentation or the expression of joy or worry; some of it consists of
denunciation, or manipulation, or planning, or
the giving of orders—think of Creon speaking
to Antigone—or the pursuit of clarification, as
in Oedipus. All of these gestures can, of
course, be ways of giving meaning to experience, but they have not quite the quality I seek
to define, which includes a kind of summing
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up, a self-consciousness, an effort to imagine
the whole world and oneself and others within
it, to see one’s story as a whole and among
other stories. It is the full performance of a
gesture that is begun over and over in human
experience, both in our own lives and on the
stage, but rarely taken to completion.
Let me give two brief instances. In
Oedipus at Colonus, the blind and aged man
finds at last a home in the sanctuary of
Colonus on the edge of Attica. The townspeople in the chorus are afraid of him and wish to
drive him off; Creon, his brother in-law,
comes from Thebes to seize and bring him
back to that city, to ensure that he will be buried there and thus confer on Thebes the benefits which an oracle has promised to the place
that receives his body. Oedipus himself is
filled with a sense of cost and loss, of his own
status as an object of fear and taboo, but he
also displays a remarkable serenity, an integrity of mind; and towards the end, in an argument with Creon, he surprisingly asserts his
essential innocence. He looks back over his
entire life and claims new meaning for it. He
was, he says, the object of a divine decree
from birth that he should do these unspeakable things—how, then, can it have been his
fault? He did not know who it was he killed,
or who it was he was marrying; and when he
did kill he acted in self-defense. He has—and
he knows it—violated the deepest of taboos
and is by this fact eternally marked; but he
also sees that in another and deeper sense he is
innocent as well. The action of the play confirms this sense of his own deep innocence, in
two ways: first, in Theseus’ expulsion of
Creon and acceptance of Oedipus into the territory of Athens; then, in Oedipus’ own apotheosis, his conversion by divine power on his
death into a kind of quasi-deity himself.
Or consider the Ajax of Sophocles. The
story here takes place during the Trojan War,
just after the death of Achilles. The armor of
Achilles is given by the leaders, Agamemnon
and Menelaus, not to Ajax, who is sure he de-
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“Oh, Miserable am I” laments a blind Oedipus in this 1880 illustration. Like heroes of Greek tragedy,
Supreme Court Justices struggle to claim that they can describe, explain, and justify their decisions in an
appropriate way.

serves this mark of honor, but to Odysseus, in
what Ajax regards as an act of fraud. Filled
with fury and a sense of injury, Ajax sets forth
at night to kill Odysseus and the two leaders,
the only response this man of war and honor
can possibly imagine. Athena sees him do
this, and deludes him into thinking that a herd
of sheep and goats are the enemies he seeks;
he slaughters them, delighted at his revenge;
but then he gradually returns to sanity, surrounded by the corpses of these animals, a
laughingstock to the whole world, utterly humiliated. The course for him is plain, and he
faces it clearly and with characteristic courage: “It’s a contemptible thing to want to live
forever . . . Let a man nobly live or nobly
die.”16 The meaning of his situation is that he
should die and be done with it.
Tecmessa, the woman with whom he
lives and by whom he has had his only son,
pleads with him not to end his life, for the moment he dies she and their son will become

slaves of others, which will be horrible for
themselves and a humiliation both to Ajax’
parents, who are still alive, and to his own
memory. Ajax at first rejects her claim, but he
is in fact affected by what she says, and when
he returns to the stage after a choral ode lamenting his decision, he speaks in a wholly
different way, not from inside his misery of
the moment but from outside, at an enormous
distance, philosophical or religious in kind.
Strangely the long and countless
drift of time
Brings all things forth from darkness into light,
Then covers them once more. Nothing so marvelous
That man can say it surely will not
be—
Strong oath and iron intent come
crashing down.
My mood, which just before was
strong and rigid,
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No dipped sword more so, now has
lost its edge—
My speech is womanish for this
woman’s sake;
And pity touches me for my wife
and child…
So, he says, he will go to the shore of the sea
and purify himself, hiding his sword in the
sand.
From now on this will be my rule:
Give way
To Heaven and bow before the sons
of Atreus.
They are our rulers, they must be
obeyed.
I must give way, as all dread
strengths give way,
In turn and deference. Winter’s
hard-packed snow
Cedes to the fruitful summer; stubborn night
At last removes, for day’s white
steeds to shine.
The dread blast of the gale slackens
and gives
Peace to the sounding sea; and
Sleep, strong jailer,
In time yields up his captive. Shall
not I
Learn place and wisdom?
This is an extraordinary speech. It represents
an enormous shift of mind and feeling, from a
self-centered despair to an acceptance of his
lot, which is in turn based at least in part on a
recognition of the claims and experience of
others. Ajax can now see Tecmessa, not
merely as a possession, but as a person with
whose experience he can sympathize. His virtue has so far been to be without pity; now he
can pity. What is more, he now sees his present defeat not as a single, unique, and humiliating event, but as part of the larger order and
process of the world, in which all dread and
powerful things give way in the end: winter,
and night, and storms, and sleep, and wakeful-
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ness. We live amidst cycling emergences and
withdrawals, dominances and submissions, of
which this event is only one. His humiliation
is thus stripped of social and moral significance and made a fact, a fact of nature, like
death itself.
This speech is, therefore, an answer to a
central question the play presents, which is
how one can possibly live in a world in which
life is so utterly subject to chance, even malicious destruction. The answer is ultimately a
matter of voice and character, of imagination
and speech. Ajax lives in a world of uncertainty and destruction; but he can see that and
say it, and in doing this can see himself, not as
a unique heroic ego, but as part of a set of processes larger than he; and all this enables him
to accept his life, and its conditions.17
There is enacted in this speech an impulse that is perhaps first made part of the
Western inheritance here in the tragic drama
of Greece: the impulse to stop, to sum up life
as a whole and to try to make sense of it, to
claim a meaning for it; to try to imagine the
world and oneself within it in such a way as to
make meaningful action possible—whether
that action is the kind of suicide upon which
Ajax first resolves, and later, perhaps still
under the destructive spell of Athena, commits, or whether it is the kind of life in connection with others that he, in this speech, for
a moment, imagines.
What is more, this kind of speech is, I
think, essential to the deepest contribution of
tragic drama, which is, as Hegel said, to give
dignity to human life by recognizing and enacting the possibility that the human mind—
the self or soul—can maintain its integrity
even, or especially, at the moment of its dissolution.18 It is such an act of character and
imagination that enables Oedipus to overcome and transform what he has done; that
enables Prometheus, chained to the rock, to
maintain a moral and psychological superiority to the Zeus who tortures him; and that enables Ajax, for a moment at least, to accept
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and live with the humiliation thrust upon him
by fate and the gods. It is in the human capacity for speech of a certain kind that human
dignity most deeply resides: speech that invokes what is distant and remote and brings it
before the mind, where it can provide material
and a point of view from which the culture,
and the self, can be criticized; speech that
moves, as the play and trial both do, by opposition and contrast into new perception and
understanding; and speech, like that of Ajax
or Oedipus, that seeks to sum up experience
and claim a meaning for it.
To return once more to Cohen, I want
now to suggest that in writing his opinion for
the Court, as, in a sense, in any judicial opinion of any real quality, Justice Harlan is expressing very much the same impulse, in a different context, that we saw at work in Ajax
and Oedipus: the desire to sum things up, to
tell again the story of the past, to imagine the
world and its people, all in ways that will
make possible coherent speech, intelligible
and appropriate action. For part of the duty of
the Court is to say how this case should be
talked about in the language the Court has
made—in this instance, the language made in
cases decided under the First Amendment. To
do this, it must attend to the entire authoritative past created by the Court and do so with
the duty of resolving so far as it can the tensions it discovers within it, with the aim of asserting, for the moment, that justice has been
done. It must use this language to make a
claim both to coherent speech and to appropriate action.
How does Justice Harlan, speaking for
the Court in the Cohen case, attempt to do
these things? Here is a brief outline of what
might be called the argumentative structure of
his opinion.
He begins a bit like a modernist painter
sculpting out negative space by telling what,
in his words, this case “does not present” (emphasis in original). First, he says this is a case
in which the state seeks to punish, not conduct

that is associated with speech, but speech itself.19 Likewise, it does not involve a statute
directed at the special need for decorous
speech and conduct in the courthouse or its
precincts, but one of general applicability.
This means that no special deference is due
any judgment of the legislature as to the
proper control of speech in the halls of a
courthouse, for no such judgment has been
made.20 And, despite the sexual vulgarity of
the central term employed, this is not an obscenity case, for the expression is in no way
erotic.21 Furthermore, the phrase in question
does not qualify as the sort of expression the
Court has termed “fighting words,” unprotected by the First Amendment, for it was not
a direct personal insult. Nor is a prohibition of
this phrase justified by the fact that it was
forced upon “unwilling or unsuspecting viewers,” as a “captive audience”; to justify suppression on such grounds, the government
must show that “substantial privacy interests
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner,” which is not the case here.22
Harlan thus runs through nearly the entire
body of potentially relevant First Amendment
law, only to put it aside on the grounds that it
does not bear on the case before him. That is,
he simultaneously admits the surface relevance of the arguments he states and denies
their real force in this case. He is here addressing and resolving the sort of argumentative
opposition between lawyers I referred to earlier, and it is important to say—although it
would take too long for me to show that it is
so—that none of the points he dismisses is
without some merit, none of his own positions
beyond argument. He recognizes what can be
said the other way, but is, at the same time,
exercising a power—the power of a language-shaper—to determine its scope and
basis and reach.
All this is, for him, a kind of brush-clearing that opens up what he regards as the real
issue in the case, which is whether California
may “excise, as ‘offensive conduct,’ one par-
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ticular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse.” It cannot do so, he first says, on the
theory advanced by the court below, namely
that it is “inherently likely to cause a violent
reaction,” for that is simply not the case.23
However, there is a second theory supporting
the conviction, which in his view commands
more respect and attention: namely, that the
states may suppress this “unseemly expletive”
in an effort to “maintain what they regard as a
suitable level of discourse within the body
politic.”24
He begins his examination of this question at a highly general level, reimagining as it
were the first premises of the legal universe.
First, he says, we must make this judgment
with an understanding of the purpose of the
constitutional right of free expression: “It is
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely in the hands of each of
us, in the hope that such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and
more perfect polity, and in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our system rests.”25 This is a lovely and
economical statement, drawn from a more extended one, the famous dissent of Justice
Brandeis in Whitney v. California,26 to which
Harlan makes reference. The result of this
freedom, Harlan goes on to say, “may often
appear to be verbal tumult, discord, and even
offensive utterance.”27 But these are side effects of what a broader debate enables us to
achieve, and “that the air may at times seem to
be filled with verbal cacophony is, in this
sense, not a sign of weakness, but of
strength.”28
Then, in turning to the particulars of this
case, Harlan makes two central points. First
he says that the result contended for by the
prosecution would confer “inherently boundless” powers on the state. For if this word can
be excised from public speech, where is the
power to stop? What he means is that there is
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simply no principled way to distinguish between this particular term and others. This
view rests on an important understanding of
the nature of language, namely, that words
cannot be sorted like peas or bolts, according
to size or weight. They have a life that is more
mysterious and multidimensional, more context-dependent, than such a view would
allow.
Second—and central to the ultimate
meaning of the case—Harlan says that to
force a translation of Cohen’s utterance into
more socially presentable speech would strip
it of much of its significance. For human
speech, he says in a passage I quoted earlier,
“conveys not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well”; and we cannot believe that the Constitution has “little or
no regard” for this “emotive function, which
practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated.”29 And even if
this is not true, he thinks that it would be too
facile to assume that one “can forbid particular words without also running a substantial
risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”30
Note the tension here. First Harlan says
that speech does more than express “ideas,”
and that what he calls its emotional content is
crucial to its value; then he returns to the topic
of “ideas,” saying that we cannot be confident
that the suppression of vulgarity would not involve the suppression of “ideas,” as though
ideas are the important things after all. He
thus reaffirms the distinction between ideas
and feelings he has just criticized; but the earlier criticism—insisting on the value of emotive expression—continues to work, thus
transforming his point from its rather crude
statement about “ideas” to a crucial recognition that our language about language is itself
inherently limited and constricting. What
unites his two perceptions, despite the tensions between them, is his sense that we cannot be confident that we can know how the

60

JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY

meaning of language works, certainly not so
confident that we can inflict surgery on an utterance without running the risk of destroying
its life.
This is the most important part of the
meaning of the Court’s opinion: a sensitivity
to the fact that meaning and form are inseparable. It is a familiar truth of literary criticism
that the meaning of a poem or a play or a
novel, or any other work of art, lies not in any
restatement of it into other terms—in any
message or idea—but in its performance, in
the life and experience it creates for its audience or viewer. In adopting and performing
this position in the law, Harlan takes an enormously significant step away from the view
that the First Amendment should be held to
protect only speech that contributes to the
marketplace of “ideas,” and especially of political ideas. Of course Cohen’s own speech is
deeply political; but the way the Court imagines and resolves his case makes the amendment reach much further, to the protection of
art and perhaps—as one might wish to do in
the case of Greek drama—to a dissolution of
the simple distinction between political and
nonpolitical, as the opinion dissolves the distinction between ideas and feelings.
There is thus this additional connection
between the opinion in Cohen v. California
and the Greek dramas with which we began,
that Cohen provides a language and an authority for the protection of these plays and others
like them. It is not only itself a drama; it is a
way of thinking about drama.
In comparing the form of classic Greek
tragedy and that of the Supreme Court opinion, my hope has been to begin to establish a
somewhat clearer sense of the ways in which
they work as institutions for the making of
collective meaning. One idea is that increased
understanding of these matters might lead to
deeper criticism, and perhaps even to better
performance of the judicial opinion. The three
points of comparison made here, for example,
can be seen to generate questions that can be

brought to the reading and criticism of any judicial opinion.
1) To what extent does this
opinion bring into the circle of public
awareness persons or events or other
material that are normally repressed,
ignored, or overlooked? Does it do
this with the kind of particularity that
will bring to the surface something
new and problematic, and thus become the occasion for growth and
change, both in our perceptions of
the world and in the law?
2) Does it work in an explicit
way by dramatic opposition and development (as opposed, for example,
to the deductive application of theory)? In particular, how far does the
Court recognize that its own language of description, argument, and
conclusion has, as it were, a shadow
version opposed to it, represented by
the losing side? For the Court does
its job, not just by reasoning to a result, but by recognizing the force and
reality of other views, other ways of
imagining and speaking. And does
the Court find a way to create significant dramatic tensions within its own
opinion, as Harlan does with respect
to what I have called the two registers of discourse reflected here?
3) Does the Court find a way to
sum up the law and claim a meaning
for it, and, if so, with what kind and
degree of coherence? In a First
Amendment case, for example, we
can ask whether the Court has a
workable view of the aims and principles of that text, which in turn requires a view of the nature of human
speech, and of language itself;
whether it has a way of imagining
the Constitution as a whole, and the
roles of the various actors within it—
legislatures, juries, other courts, it-

HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE CLAIM OF MEANING
self; whether it offers, in short, a way
of imagining this case and the law
and the larger society that will enable
it to reach a result which it can claim
to be just, not only in some technical
way, but truly just. And in all three
dimensions of meaning we shall be
interested not only in the Court’s explicit statements or arguments, but,
as I have tried to suggest with respect
to Harlan’s opinion in Cohen v. California, in the meaning of the performance enacted in the opinion itself.
*

*

*

*

*

I think that the desire for meaning of the
kind that is reflected in the speeches of
Oedipus and Ajax is the deepest impulse from
which literature comes, and that it lies at the
heart of our hopes when we approach a judicial opinion, especially a Supreme Court
opinion. But the impulse is even more general
than that, for we ourselves participate in it in
our own lives and imaginations. Every human
being shares the desire to find a way of describing and claiming meaning for his or her
experience—at the most general level, a way
of imagining the world, and herself (or himself) and others within it, that will make possible coherent speech and valuable action, even
in the face of the deep uncertainties and injustices life necessarily presents.31 The process is
never complete, for the future lines of the
story we are telling are necessarily unknown
to us; but we know that when they come they
will certainly, like the murder of Agamemnon
or the madness of Ajax, give new meaning to
what is past. As we do this, we work against
two deep fears: that the story we shall then be
able to tell will have a meaning that is intolerable to us—or no meaning at all.
To discover shape and coherence and significance in a work of art—or law—presents
us with an acute form of this problem, for it simultaneously stimulates the desire for meaning of the kind I mean and reminds us that our
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experience, our story—like that of Agamemnon—is necessarily incomplete. In this way it
is the function of art, and law too, to challenge
life at its imaginative center.
To test out the depth and pervasiveness of
the human desire to discover a way to claim
meaning for one’s experience, imagine for the
moment that we could not claim meaning for
our experience; that all our speech was reducible—as, indeed, certain strains of thought in
our own world would reduce it—to something
called information. Under these conditions,
instead of what we call meaningful speech,
we would send signals that communicated
particular desires or aversions, expressed a
willingness or a refusal to engage in a course
of conduct, and so on. We could make offers,
pay bills, get the car fixed, go to the hairdresser, buy a suit, order a dinner, arrange for
sexual gratification, watch or play baseball,
but we could not say what any of these things
means to us. We could not justify our decisions, or explain our preferences, we could
only act on them; we could not engage in the
kind of conversation by which we discover
who we are, what we desire, or should desire,
what kind of life we live and want to live. Life
could go on as a series of exchanges, and expression as a set of signals that make the exchanges possible. But such an existence
would in the most important sense not be
human, for it would omit the most deeply
human form of speech, which is the effort to
define our experience and claim a meaning for
it. Description, explanation, justification:
these are for us essential activities of mind
and language.
As we have seen, the form we call the
opinion of the Supreme Court—like the
drama—is a cultural institution that works to
teach the public: in part by bringing into the
zone of collective attention that which is distant or remote, unseen and particular; in part
by the way it works through dramatic opposition, with character poised against character,
voice against voice; in part by the way it seeks
to give meaning to the events thus examined,
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locating them in a larger context and a larger
story, running back in time and including, potentially, all the elements of its institutional
memory. It does this in a language fashioned
for the purpose, in which the Court—like
Ajax or Oedipus—claims, or struggles to
claim, that it can describe, explain, and justify
its decision in an appropriate way, one that
will make possible coherent speech and
meaningful action in the future. And like the
drama it has the potential, at least—in my
view, realized in cases like Cohen and many
others, though not all—to enhance our sense
of the dignity of human life and experience, in
resistance to those forces, in this and every
age, that would trivialize these things.
In the judicial opinion and the drama
alike, we are thus exposed to imaginations
that, at their best, confront the deep uncertainties of the world, of language and the mind,
but nonetheless create orders, in language,
that run against those uncertainties. But in
each—the speech of Ajax, the play that bears
his name, the opinion in Cohen—the order is
tentative, temporary, soon to be replaced by
others, or redefined as the context that gives it
meaning changes. In this way, both forms call
upon us, as readers, to engage in our own versions of this fundamental activity of imagination and language: Become a maker of order
yourself, they tell us, become one who claims
meaning for our shared experience, or the
possibility will be lost.
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ply averting their eyes.” Id. at 21. Harlan concludes that
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